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I
The giftofprophecy has never loomed large in the endowment of
economists, whether lay or professional. A generationago, how-
ever, the professional analyst of business conditions at least had
the advantage of being able to organize his thinking around such
venerable concepts as a self-generating cycle anda regularly rising
secular trend. If the advantage proved ephemeral, it nevertheless
kept uncertainty under decent restraint while it lasted. Looking
back across the years between the Civil War and the first World
War, one could see a fairly regular fluctuation in business activity
emerging. Except for the lapse in 1895, each peak ofan expanding
wave towered above its immediate predecessor. The shortest of
the nine cycles before 1914lastedthirty-five months and the long-
est only forty-six months. The amplitudes of successive cycleswere
less uniform but severe depressionswere infrequent. Through the
international gold standard oureconomy was linked closely to the
rest of the world. Every recovery and recession in Western Europe
had its counterpart in American experience, althoughwe man-
aged to generate some special cycles ofour own. The most spec-
tacular fluctuations occurred commonly inour financial markets
and activities preparatory to investment expenditure;and since
these seemed to have a critical bearingon developments in the
industrial sphere, the movements of stock prices, interestrates,
business failures, and investment orders attracted wideattention.
The outbreak of war in 1914broughtnew and difficult eco-
nomic problems. It was generally expected, however,that upon
the return of peace the dislocations wrought bywar would quickly
vanish and the world economy revertto its prewar pattern of
growth and fluctuation. This expectationwas scarcely fulfilled out-
side the United States. A wild inflation, whichenabled Germany
to escape the world-wide depression of 1920-1921,broughtdisaster
in late 1923. Inflation stopped short of completeriot in France
but lasted longer and likewise servedto insulate its economy. Eng-
land followed a path of financial orthodoxy, butcould not reduce
unemployment to the prewar level and faced the ordeal ofa gen-
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eral strike in 1926. Russia, having fallen towards the closeof the
war under communist control, lostlittle time in organizing for a
test of strength with the outside world. Of the great powersthe
United States alone enjoyed a return to "normalcy." While the
depression of 1920-1921 was severe,it passed quickly and was
widely accepted as a salutary check of speculative exuberance. The
prosperity that followed grew marvelously except for a pausein
1923-1924 and another in 1926-1927.Business cqnfidence ran high
despite the monetary, industrial, and political disorganizationin
other parts of the world. No special controls beyond thoseresiding
in the Federal Reserve System seemed necessary to keep thebusi-
ness cycle in check. And for a briefwhile, as one foreign nation
after another limped back to the gold standard under the um-
brella of our easy money policy, the prewar world seemed restored.
As we look back to the 1920'S, three facts about the business
cycle stand out. The first is that it was natural to frame expecta-
tions about the business future on the assumptions of interna-
tional peace and of normal business relations among nations. Sec-
ond, it was natural to think of the government as playing a minor
role in business fluctuations. Third, it was natural to thinkof
business depressions as passing interruptions of progress.This con-
cept of normal business in a peacefuland progressive world, which
ruled our economic thinking in the twenties, was severelytested
by stubborn depression in the thirties, and then nearlyshattered
by war and its sequelae in the forties. The old order did not change
at once, but it changed swiftly. Internationaldisunity erupted first
in currency and trade wars, later in ideological and military war-
fare. And prolonged depression, a second world war, and the grow-
ing menace of communism brought to the American people a vast
network of controls, high taxes, still higher expenditures, but also
a new conception of public responsibilityfor coping with booms
and depressions.
II
The presidential campaign of 1952 gave clear testimony ofhow
profoundly the economic and political storms of recent years have
changed our intellectual outlook. The Republican party was not
less emphatic than the Democratic party in urging the importance
of governmental action to foster a stable economy. In the course
of one of his addresses, Mr. Eisenhower declared that "neveragain
shall we allow a depression in the United States." He went on to
say that if signs appear "of any. ..depressionthat would put ..
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men and women out of work, the full power of private industry,
of municipal government, of state government, of the federalgov-
ernment will be mobilized to see that that does not happen." This
declaration of governmental responsibilitygoes well beyond the
Employment Act of 1946. It caps a long line of social thinking that
first had as its objective the cushioning of depression,next pump-
priming expenditure, then compensatory fiscal policy, and, finally,
comprehensive contracyclical action.
The traditional attitude of letting business depressions 'blow
themselves out' had already been repudiated by the Hoover ad-
ministration. Its experiments with contracyclical deviceswere not
sufficient, however, to check the rising tide of unemployment. The
Roosevelt administration moved withgreater vigor and attempted
both to engineer recovery andto reconstruct economic society. New
measures designed to increase the money supply, raise the price
level, reform the banking system and security markets, relievethe
distress of farmers and unemployed workers, aid localgovern-
ments, protect homeowners, strengthen trade unions, stimulate
construction work, and reduce the inequality of personal incomes
followed one another in quick succession. On the whole,con-
sumer spending responded much better to the governmental meas-
ures than private investment. Unemployment was reduced but not
eliminated. In 1937-1938 economic activity suffereda sharp set-
back and 8 million were still unemployed in1940.
Since then the course of international events has dominated the
economic scene. Military demands for men, materials, machines,
and munitions started to climb after the collapse of France and
became insatiable after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Taxes in-
creased sharply, yet expenditures outran taxes anda huge federal
deficit accumulated. At the same time, personal incomes mounted,
unemployment disappeared, civilian consumption increased, liquid
assets piled up, and curbs on inflation replaced recovery stimu-
lants. The war experience raised the hopenot only of intellectuals
but of common folk everywhere that depressions could bepre-
vented in the future by vigorous governmental policy. Before long
official pronouncements of individualgovernments, including our
own, and the Charter of the United Nations gave eloquentexpres-
sion to this hope.
With the approach of victory men's minds turned again to the
tasks of peace. In 1944 federal outlays on goods and serviceswere
over 40 per cent of the gross national product, and of course in-
terest and transfer payments carried dollar expenditures far beyond
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the volume of purchases. Under the circumstances there was, quite
naturally, considerable uncertainty whether demobilization and
abrupt cuts in war production could be carried through without
bringing back mass unemployment. The fears proved unfounded.
The civilian economy, starved for self-expression through the war
and more handsomely equipped with cash than ever before, mani-
fested a power with which not many economists were then in-
clined to credit it—a power to generate activity on as lavish a scale
as had the military a few years earlier. Between the first quarters
of iand i 946, federal purchases fell from an annual rate of
$91 billion to a rate of $26 billion. But buying by the rest of the
community, principally households and domestic business firms,
increased sufficiently to replace two-thirds of the decline. By the
first quarter of 1947 federal purchases were down to an annual
rate of $i6 billion, a drop of $7 billion from their peak rate. In
the meantime, the gross national product had risen slightly, so that
the rest of the economy fully compensated for the unprecedented
reduction in governmental spending. Of course, commodity prices
rose sharply after price controls were dropped and the rise con-
tinued well into 1948. At the same time the physical volume of
activity also increased and all major branches of the economy—
including federal purchases, which were already being lifted by
Marshall Plan aid—continued to expand until the closing quarter
of 1948.
The recession which began in the fall of that year was of slight
consequence. Consumer expenditures continued to expand, as
did housing construction, automobile production, and many other
activities. In all, the gross national product declined merely 4 per
cent, and this reflected principally a drop of inventory investment.
By the last quarter of 1949 aggregate activity was again moving
upward. Recovery was rapid and proceeded without special aid
from the public purse, except for the veterans' insurance dividend,
until the fateful month of June iqo, when the communists struck
with guns in Korea. The noble illusion of peace in our time was
now ended. Once again the government projected a heavy phase
of military spending, higher taxes, and ramifying controls. Mean-
while, consumers and businessmen alike, fearing that shortages of
civilian goods would soon develop, rushed to stock up on all sorts
of things. For a few months prices rose at an alarming pace; but
production also expanded rapidly and by early 1951 it became
evident that merchandise was generally in good supply and that
the anticipated shortages had failed to materialize. Presently, con-
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sumers revised their expectations and stopped adding frantically
to their accumulated stocks. Manufacturers and dealers in con-
sumer goods responded in similar fashion, and a sizable decline of
output in the consumer goods industries followed. This quies-
cence of the civilian sector proved very timely and neutralized the
inflationary pressure of military spending. Federal outlays on
goods and services, which were at an annual rate of $sibillion in
the first quarter of 1951, rose to $55 billion eighteen months later;
but the aggregate physical volume of production increased only
slightly and the level of wholesale prices declined somewhat. Of
late, consumer spending has increased perceptibly, although per-
sonal savings have continued at an exceptionally high level.
Taken as a whole, the quarter century since 1929, some of whose
features I have so hastily sketched, provides the sharpest contrasts
of business conditions in our history_contraction running from
the mildest to the most violent of which we have any knowledge,
expansion ranging from hesitant recovery to a long and vigorous
boom. The tendency towards regularity in cyclical fluctuations,
which seemed so clear a generation earlier, became fuzzy. Social
control of business cycles emerged as a political necessity, both do-
mestically and internationally. Extensive experiments in contra-
cyclical action were undertaken, of which a persistent tendency
towards easy money and a persistent difficulty in attaining budg-
etary balance became the principal outward symbols. Foreign de-
velopments at times aided, at others complicated, the efforts of
government to promote a stable and prosperous economy. Over a
considerable part of the period the rate of governmental spending,
buffeted about as it was by international developments, itself be-
came the principal active factor in the economic situation, rather
than a response to variations of private spending. In some years
the civilian economy compensated for the violent shifts in public
spending, in others it aggravated their consequences. At all times,
even when sales and profits were eminently satisfactory, uncertainty
about the course of international relations or of governmental
economic policy added a note of anxiety to business planning. On
the other hand, the social legislation of the period, which aimed
to afford some protection against the hazards of unemployment,
old age, bank failures, and declining farm prices, brought a new
sense of security to millions of Americans.
III
In closing his first book on Business Cycles in 1913, Wesley Mitch-
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eli ventured the prediction that, since cumulative changes in eco-
nomic organization are likely to occur in the future as they have
in the past, the economists of each generation "will see reason to
recast the theory of business cycles which they learned in their
youth." The course of events in the past quarter century has borne
out his historical insight. Not only have recent fluctuations in ag-
gregate activity become less regular in duration, but many of their
internal features have been modified. For example, the tendency
of interest rates to rise during expansions of aggregate activity has
become decidedly weaker, the ability of wage rates to resist con-
tractions has become stronger, the conformity of the velocity of
bank deposits to over-all economic movements has become irreg-
ular, the lag of dividends at cyclical turns has become shorter, the
tendency of private construction contracts to lead general recovery
and recession has become less dependable. But cumulative move-
ments of expansion and contraction have continued to diversify
our economic fortunes, and many features of earlierbusiness cycles
have persisted although they have been obscured by the predomi-
nantly expansive pressures since 1938. The sequence of develop-
ments in 1948-1949, as Geoffrey Moore has shown, bore a striking
resemblance to earlier cyclical declines; and the shrinkage of pri-
vate spending during i5i, when public spending was rapidly
expanding, is another warning that the present boom will not
last forever.
The only things we can be reasonably certain of in the proxi-
mate future are, first, that our economic system will continue to
generate cyclical tendencies, and second, that the government will
at some stage intervene to check their course. The outcome of
these opposing tendencies must needs be, at this time, a matter of
judgment. It is reasonable to expect that contracyclical policy will
moderate the amplitude and abbreviate the duration of business
contractions in the future, so that our children will be spared the
sort of economic collapse that blighted lives in the early thirties.
The strengthening of the banking system, the development of
unemployment compensation and general assistance programs, the
large and automatic reduction of taxes that now takes place when
the national income contracts, and above all the assurance that the
government is not likely to permit deflation to proceed unchecked
support this faith. But there are no adequate grounds, as yet, for
believing that business cycles will soon disappear, or that the gov-
ernment will resist inflation with as much tenacity as depression,
or that deep but brief contractions such as occurred in 1920-1921
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and 1937-1938willnever again take place. Our limited experience
with contracyclical policy does not provide strong support for the
belief, so often expressed by theoretical writers, that the govern-
ment is capable of adjusting its spending, taxing, and regulatory
policies with the fine precision and promptness needed to assure
virtually full employment and a virtually stable price level at all
times. Not only is the art of contracyclical action as yet imperfect-
ly understood, but there are practical obstacles to the effective use
of such knowledge as exists. In a world in which international
crises keep recurring, in which the domestic population clamors
for relief from burdensome taxes, and in which differentgroups of
the community are either deserving or persuasive enoughto win
the special solicitude of government, considerations of economic
stability neither are nor can be the sole concern of public policy.
These obstacles to effective contracyclical action are likely to
continue. It may be hoped, however, that as knowledge of business
cycles is extended, contracyclical policy will improve and the
burden of counteracting its own mistakes will become lighter. In-
terest in business cycles has never been so keen, nor the social and
political importance of curbing their wandering so widely recog-
nized, as at present. Perhaps, before many years pass, an economic
general staff will emerge within the government and take on some
of the characteristics of military general staffs. Just as the military
often find it helpful to draft plans for resisting different potential
aggressors, each or a combination of whom may strike at this point
or at that, so an economic staff may in the future find it prudent
to work concurrently on plans for meeting a great variety of eco-
nomic troubles that we loosely call booms and depressions. And
just as the military staff tends to concentrate on immediate danger
points, but without neglecting the lessons of past campaigns and
battles, so the economic staff may come to combine historical and
theoretical research on business cycles with the devising of policies
to meet emerging conditions. But though much may be accom-
plished by a general economic staff in the future, it is unlikely that
it will ever be able to pursue far enoughor deeply enough all the
problems that come its way. In the future,as in the past, the sci-
entific study of business cycles will therefore continueto be a pri-
mary responsibility of our great centers of learning—the univer-
sities and private research institutes like the National Bureau.
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Iv
The 'new economics,' of which less is heard nowadays than a few
years back, found little need for the study of business cycles as an
earlier generation knew it. Equipped with a 'consumption func-
tion' that was supposed to take full account of the influence of
variations in the national income on consumer outlay, looking
upon investment expenditure as an 'exogenous' variable that
shaped the course of the nation's income, and braced by a crisp
formula of compensatory fiscal policy, the new economists had
sufficient thunder without bothering much about the cumulative
processes of change and adjustment in a business economy. Their
bold thinking stimulated much useful analysis and research, but
experience has not dealt gently with their simplification of Keynes'
teaching. Under the influence of war and inflation, a strong inter-
est has of late reemerged in the mutual adjustment of costs and
prices; in the influence of consumer spending, profits, construction
costs, and terms of financing on business investment; in the influ-
ence of accumulated assets, borrowing, and changing expectations
of consumers on their rate of spending; in the influence of invest-
ment on industrial productivity, on business competition, and
commodity prices_in short, in the numerous and lagged responses
that bind economic activities together into a system. Theoretical
models of business cycles are once again exciting general attention
and, while they may sometimes unwittingly caricature the eco-
nomic process, their emphasis on cumulative movements, lags, and
self-reversing tendencies is salutary.
Except for the minor setbacks in 1945 and 1948-1949, our econ-
omy has moved steadily forward since 1938. This is undoubtedly
the longest sustained expansion of recent history, yet it is not the
only movement of its kind. The period from 1921 to 1929 was also
one of sustained expansion broken only by minor cyclical declines;
so too were the periods from 1897 to 1907, 1885 to 1893, and 1867
to 1873—if not the entire span from i858 to 1873. Each of these
major expansions culminated in a speculative boom, each was
followed by deep depression, and three of the depressions lasted
years. One of the important tasks awaiting students of business
cycles is thorough historical study of the booms that preceded these
as well as other contractions. Studies of this type are worth making,
not because of any immutabilities of historical sequence, but be-
cause there is a need to clarify the work of policy makers who, while
earnestly resolved to do away with depressions, sometimes seem to
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neglect the need of controlling booms and trust too exclusively in
our ability to check any contraction that may get under way.
Of the massive materials compiled by the National Bureau, we
have thus far analyzed most carefully the record of the twenties.
The extravagance of its boom in common stocks is notorious, but
the speculation of the time was by no means confined to stocks. It
extended to urban real estate, foreign government bonds, and many
types of industrial enterprise. As the decade rolled on, borrowing
piled up in all directions but the quality of new loans, as measured
by their later ability to meet the test of hard times, declined pro-
gressively. Thus Ilse Mintz has found that i8 per cent of the dollar
amount of foreign government loans placed in the United States
during 1920-1924 defaulted during the thirties. The wave of de-
faults caught a much larger proportion of later issues: 50 per cent
of the bonds acquired from 1925 to 1929 and 63 per cent of those
acquired in 1928. Saulnier's study of urban mortgage loans by life
insurance companies, the study of mortgage loans of commercial
banks made by Behrens, and Hickman's recent study of domestic
corporate bonds likewise indicate a progressive relaxation of credit
standards. Hickman finds, for example, that 17 per cent of the par
amount of railroad bonds offered during 1920-1924, but fully 53
per cent of the amount offered over the next quinquennium, went
into default by 1944. The defaults ran lower in the case of public
utility and industrial bonds, yet each of these groups also showed
a trend towards deterioration. The net result was that the bonds
offered in the early twenties eventually yielded something more to
investors than they had been promised, while the offerings of the
late twenties__especially those issued at the very height of the
boom__brought the average investor far less than the promised
yield.
Hickman has also gathered some empirical evidence on the busi-
ness psychology of the twenties, and this is especially interesting in
view of the huge expansion in practically every category of private
debt in the United States since 1945. One might perhaps expect
that the investment rating agencies, if not the financial market
generally, would have recognized the increasing risk that attended
the new bond issues. This did not happen in the twenties: the op-
timism of the time was general and financial specialists did not
escape infection. Judging from Hickman's compilations, the rat-
ing agencies failed to sense the declining quality of new bond issues
before 1928, perhaps not even then. The judgment of the market
place was poorer still, as is evident from the fact that thepropor-
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don of new offerings rated as high grade by the market rose rather
consistently over the decade for each of the major bond categories
—railroads, utilities, and industrials. These findings enlarge the
significance of use Mintz' earlier comparison of the risk premium
on foreign bonds with their subsequent performance. Apparently,
investors in domestic as well as foreign securities "not only were
unaware of the increasing riskiness of new . .issuesbut even
grew more confident at the very time the quality of new bonds
was lowest."
It is, of course, impossible for any people to see their own cur-
rent actions, shaped as they are in large degree by expectations of
an uncertain future, with the cold detachment and knowledge that
a later generation can sometimes bring to the same events. Eco-
nomic research will never alter this pervasive feature of life. It
may, however, usefully bend the course of events, first by bringing
the lessons of experience to bear on current developments, and
second, by devising improved methods of diagnosing the direction
in which the economy is currently moving. The latter problem, no
less than the former, has long occupied the attention of the Na-
tional Bureau. Our greatest contribution has been, of course, the
development of national income and gross product accounts, which
are perhaps the most widely used of all statistics at the present
time. Morris Copeland's highly original investigation of money
flows, which we published last year, provides a new set of tools that
the Federal Reserve Board has already found helpful in its studies
of the relation between credit and economic stability. Still another
approach to economic diagnosis is the one that Mitchell, Moore,
and I have used in our studies of indicators of cyclical revivals and
recessions.
Recently, we have laid plans for exploring how one of the firmest
and most important of the Bureau's findings about the business
cycle_namely, that the cycle in aggregate activity has been in-
variably preceded by a remarkably regular cycle in the proportion
of individual activities undergoing expansion_might be put to
current use. This cycle in the structure of economic activity is a
very sensitive fluctuation. Its amplitude has been large even when
aggregate activity has undergone only minor fluctuations; further,
its movements have led by a considerable interval the movements
of aggregate activity itself. But before this knowledge, which we
have wrung from observations cast in a cyclical mould, can be
applied to the analysis of current conditions, it will first be neces-
sary to carry out extensive experiments and see if it is possible to
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construct from raw data a tolerably stable monthly or quarterly
measure of the degree of preponderance of expansions over con-
tractions or vice versa in individual lines of economic activity. In
contrast to our earlier efforts, such an index of diffusion would not
involve any assumptions about regularity of leads or lags of par-
ticular series, and this should enhance its usefulness in times of
stormy change such as ours.
Buteven if its predictive value turned out to be small, a soundly
conceived index of diffusion—preferably, a set of such indexes
covering output, employment, prices, and profits-_should at least
help students in their efforts to arrive at informed judgments about
the current state of the economy. For if it is well to know whether
aggregate activity has recently risen, it is surely desirable to know
also whether the scope of expansion in our complex economy has
broadened or narrowed. A few figures based on a cyclical index of
diffusion that we built up several years ago from a sample of over
6oo time series for the interwar period may perhaps be suggestive.
At each peak of aggregate activity, the expansions and contractions
of individual activities were approximately in balance; that is to
say, the proportion of expanding series then stood at or close to
50 per cent. This proportion declined to 47 per cent three months
later, in the downturn of 1926; to 41percent in the downturn of
1923, 38 per cent in the downturn of 1920, 31 per cent in the
downturn of 1937, and 29 per cent in the downturn of 1929—the
specific date for the figure last cited being September or one month
before the stock market crash. This ranking, based on the scope
of the contraction almost at its beginning, turns out to be pre-
cisely the same as that of the depth which the several contractions
eventually reached. Whether this correspondence has any predic-
tive significance is uncertain. It does seem, however, that if com-
pact and up-to-date information on the scope of the several con-
tractions had been available at the time, whether through a
diffusion index or some other statistical device, men charged with
responsibility for formulating economic policy could have gone
about their tasks with a somewhat keener awareness of the eco-
nomic state of the nation.
V
The figures I have cited on the contractions of the interwar period
reinforce the judgment, long entertained by observers of economic
conditions, that the causes of varying degrees of severity of busi-
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ness contractions are to be sought primarily in the developments
that precede them, rather than in the fresh complications that crop
up while the contractions are in progress. However, although it is
justifiable in the current setting to emphasize study of booms, it
would be shortsighted to neglect the study of depressions. The
high goal of business cycle research is to disclose and, as far as pos-
sible, clarify the multitude of problems with which contracyclical
programs must grapple. The business cycle of a speculative thinker
may be one phenomenon; the business cycles of experience are
many. Governmental measures that are well suited to one decline
of aggregate output may be poorly suited to another, even if its
magnitude and momentum are no different. An age which takes
contracyclical policy seriously must seek to improve knowledge of
how an economic organization based on substantial freedom of
individual enterprise typically generates cumulative movements
of expansion and contraction. Not less important, however, espe-
cially in times like ours, when international factors and govern-
mental policy loom so large, is the need to push on from knowledge
of the typical course of business cycles to their special circum-
stances and to the direct examination of the effectiveness of alter-
native contracyclical devices.
A significant part of the National Bureau's research is gradually
moving in these directions. The development of factual knowledge
about governmental economic activities has become one of our
major themes. Kendrickisinvestigating federal expenditures
over the past century and a half, giving special attention to the
influence of wars on later spending. Seltzer, Holland, and Dob-
rovolsky are making historical and statistical studies of the impact
of the federal income tax on individuals and corporations. Cope-
land is investigating the behavior of federal and local finances over
the past sixty years, concentrating on the factors that have given
rise to changes in the public debt. Robinson is studying how the
federal government has managed its debt, especially during the
great wars of our history. Earl Rolph, who is also concerning him-
self with debt management, is analyzing the effects of different
policies on economic conditions in the United States and several
other countries in the turbulent years since 1920. The federal gov-
ernment is now, of course, an important lender and guarantor of
loans as well as borrower. The recent growth in these lending op-
erations and their ramifying economic effects are being explored
by Saulnier, Jacoby, Halcrow, and their associates. Further, Stigler
and Abramovitz have begun an inquiry into the trends of govern-
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mental employment in several foreign countries, with the aim of
broadening the factual basis for interpreting the economic growth
of government in the United States over recent decades, which
Fabricant has recorded in our recently published volume.
In addition to these basic studies, Firestone has compiled new
monthly series on federal receipts and expenditures since the
1870's, which lay the groundwork for more thorough analysis of
the role of fiscal policy in past business cycles than has hitherto
been possible. Even a rough inspection of these records suggests
how instructive they are likely to prove. For they show that even
before World War I federal revenues tended to move in close
harmony with the business cycle, while expenditures ordinarily
rose during contractions as well as expansions. In other words,
'built-in' fiscal stabilizers are not an invention of recent years, al-
though their importance has gained immensely with the growth of
the federal budget. Nor can unbalanced budgets qualify as a new
development of peacetime finance. It is only proper to add, how-
ever, that although annually balanced budgets have been elusive
in experience, earlier generations had far better success than our
own both in restraining the size of public deficits and in alternating
them with surpluses.
International economic relations, which have been a constant
source of anxiety in our times, are also assuming some importance
in the Bureau's research program. To facilitate informed judg-
ments about the prospects for enlarging our foreign trade and
investment, Fabricant is now devoting himself to a close study of
their trends. Penelope Hartland is investigating the influence of
international capital movements on Canadian development. use
Mintz is analyzing the cyclical fluctuations of our foreign trade.
Morgenstern is completing a study of the cyclical behavior of inter-
national financial transactions, and Woolley is drawing plans for
extensive statistical research on the structure of world trade and
payments.
While only some of our studies of governmental activities and
international economic relations are directly concerned with cy-
clical behavior, they all are likely to enrich, and to a considerable
extent have already enriched, those of our investigations that are
more narrowly devoted to cyclical issues. The like is true of the
studies of secular changes in domestic capital formation under
Kuznets' direction, of production and productivity under Mills, of
wages and the labor force under Wolman, and of the workings of
financial institutions under Saulnier. All these investigations are
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developing new information on the changing institutional setting
within which business cycles have run their course, or are adding
to the statistical knowledge needed to construct realistic models
of the business cycle, or are contributing directly to the under-
standing of economic fluctuations. Partly under their influence,
partly as a result of progress internal to our specialized work on
business cycles, our current research on economic fluctuations—
even when it seems immersed in distant periods or issues—is sen-
sitive to newly emerging conditions. We continue to investigate
the typical features of business cycles, seeking in the spirit of sci-
ence well-founded generalizations having a wide range of applica-
tion. But our research has reached a stage where we can usefully
give increasing attention to variations among business cycles and
to the workings of contracyclical policies. Several members of our
business cycle group are now engaged in significant research in
these directions.
Thirty years have passed since Business Cycles and Unem ploy-
ment, our first study of business cycles, was published. This vol-
ume was devoted to an objective analysis of the contribution that
the government, the banking system, and individual business firms
could make to economic stability. Since then we have returned
from time to time to explicit research on contracyclical policies—
as in the studies of public works by Wolman and by Gayer in the
early 193o's; Maxwell's recent study, Federal Grants and the Busi-
ness Cycle; and the Conference papers on Regularization of Busi-
ness Investment, which are now in press. Might it not be well,
however, to pursue research on contracyclical policies more delib-
erately? For some time we have been considering the feasibility
of undertaking a full-scale empirical study of the contracyclical
efficacy of our unemployment insurance system, another of the ex-
perience gained since 1930 in the use of public works as a contra-
cyclical weapon, still another of the probable changes in disposable
income that would result under a given set of conditions from
specified changes in personal income tax rates or deductions. But
the time seems ripe, if we could manage it without injury to the
basic research now in hand, for a comprehensive investigation of
business cycle policies—an investigation that would have the same
general aim as our first book on business cycles, but which would
deal with the new as well as old instruments of policy that have
figured in the economic thinking and practice of our generation.
A broad inquiry of this sort, carried out by a corps of outstand-
ing scholars, could make a contribution of the first importance to
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public welfare as well as economic knowledge. It would be well
for us to keep this project before our minds, even if we cannot find
the way to it promptly. And we should not be deterred by the pros-
pect that the new investigation, like its predecessor of thirty years
back, will leave many questions unanswered. For not the least of
our current needs, as Cournot so well expressed it for his time, is
to make "clear how far we are from being able to solve, with full
knowledge of the case, a multitude of questions which are boldly
decided every day."
I owe a heavy debt to my colleagues, especially Geoffrey Fl. Moore, for advice
and assistance in the preparation of this report.
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